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Cozzens: Evidence - Can You Be Busted for Your Roomate's Pot - Mulligan v.

CASE NOTES
EVIDENCE-Can You Be Busted for Your Roommate's Pot? Mulligan v. State,
513 P.2d 180 (Wyo. 1973).

The offense of illegal possession of a controlled substance' provides difficult problems for the legal profession.
It only takes a small amount of an illicit drug to produce the
desired effects, and therefore such contraband can be easily
hidden. Often the offenders are young people who do not have
traditional dwelling habits, making it likely that both drug
users and nonusers will be living together. The large numbers
of offenders' and the potentially serious consequences of being
convicted of possession of illicit drugs' add to the problem,
and the result isthat the courts must develop safeguards to
protect innocent people who are in non-exclusive possession"
of the place where the drugs are found. The Wyoming Supreme Court, in Mulligan v. State,' has adopted such a
safeguard.
Appellants Larry W. Mulligan and Donald Ray Richardson were tried together and convicted of unlawful possession
of marijuana. Both appealed on the ground that there was
insufficient evidence to support the convictions. The mari1. Wyo. STAT. § 35-347.14 (Supp. 1973) lists the substances which are controlled in Wyoming. Included therein are all the common illicit drugs such
as morphine, marijuana, heroin, lysergic acid diethylamide (LSD), and
mescaline.
2. Overall estimates of the number of people who are using drugs are too
tenuous to be of much value, but the FBI reports that there were 431,608
arrests for violation of the drug and narcotics laws in 1972. That figure
includes arrests for violations other than simple possession of illicit drugs.
FBI, UNIFORM CRIME REPORTS, at 121 (1972).
3. WYO. STAT. § 35-347.31(c) (Supp. 1973), which provides in pertinent part:
"It is unlawful for any person knowingly or intentionally to possess a
controlled substance." The statute also provides for imprisonment of up
to five years and/or a fine of up to $5,000. The elements of the crime are
knowledge of the presence of the substance, and possession either actual
or constructice. A good definition of constructive possession is found in
Spatara v. State, 179 So. 2d 873, 877 (Fla. Ct. App. 1965) : "The accused
has 'constructive possession' of a chattel where he has knowledge of its
presence coupled with the ability to maintain control over it or reduce it
to his physical possession, even though he does not have actual personal
dominion." See Deeter v. State, 500 P.2d 68 (Wyo. 1972), for a case where
the Wyoming Supreme Court upheld a conviction for constructive possession
of an illicit drug.
4. The term "non-exclusive possession" is used throughout this case note to
denote a situation where the defendant was not the only person who had
access to the place where the contraband was found. The place could be
an apartment as in Mulligan v. State, 513 P.2d 180 (Wyo. 1973), a car as
in State v. Faireloth, 181 Neb. 333, 148 N.W.2d 187 (1967), or an area of
of ground as in Frazier v. State, 488 P.2d 613 (Old. Crim. App. 1971).

5. Supra note 4.
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juana was found pursuant to a search of an apartment rented
by Richardson, in which Richardson, Mulligan and a third
person lived. At the time of the search, there were at least
ten other people in the apartment. When the police arrived,
both appellants were outside the apartment. The police found
three foil-wrapped packets containing marijuana in a saucer
on a dresser in the only bedroom in the apartment. They also
found a small bag of marijuana in the living room. On appeal,
the state argued that since the appellants controlled the apartment it could be inferred that they had knowledge and possession of the mariquana that was found there, even though there
were no other corroborating circumstances. 6 Appellants argued
that these inferences could be allowed only if there were exclusive possession of the premises, or non-exclusive possession
and other corroborating circumstances. The court accepted
the appellants' argument and held: "[W]here a person is in
possession, but not exclusive possession of the premises, it may
not be inferred that he knew of the presence of marijuana
there and had control of it unless there are statements or
other circumstances tending to buttress the inference."7 This
holding is simply a corollary of the customary rule that to
convict a person on circumstantial evidence it is necessary
that the evidence exclude all rational conclusions except that
of the defendant's guilt.' While non-exclusive possession
may raise the suspicion that all occupants had knowledge of
and control over the contraband found, a mere suspicion is
not enough. What is needed is some evidence that connects
the defendant with the contraband that is found.
This case note will examine cases from other jurisdictions
which have accepted substantially the same rule as the Wyoming court now adopts,' and identify the kinds of corrobora6.

The state's argument was based mainly on People v. Nettles, 23 Ill. 2d 306,
178 N.E.2d 361 (1972).

7.

Mulligan v. State, supra note 4, at 182, quoting from Feltes v. People, 498
P.2d 1128, 1131 (Colo. 1972).

8. Mulligan v. State, supra note 4, at 182.
9. All the cases used in this casenote come from jurisdictions that have adopted
the non-exclusive possession rule. A list of those jurisdictions and a case
in each which accepts the rule follows:
Alamaba-Parks v. State, 46 Ala. App. 722, 248 So.2d 761 (Crim. App.
1971).

Arizona-State v. Hull, 15 Ariz. App. 134, 486 P.2d 814 (1971).
California-People v. Antista, 129 Cal. App. 2d 47, 276 P.2d 177 (1954).
Colorado-Feltes v. People, supra note 7.
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tive circumstances which, when coupled with non-exclusive
possession, have been held to be sufficient to allow the inferences of knowledge and possession to arise."0 This note will
also consider whether each of the different kinds of circumstances should be sufficient to allow the inferences to arise.
In general, since the shortcoming of non-exclusive possession
by itself is that there is no connection between the defendant
and the particular contraband he is charged with possessing,
the corroborating circumstance must provide that link before
the inference of knowledge and possession should be allowed.
If the evidence added to non-exclusive possession does not
provide such a link, the defendant should be acquitted.
Excluding All Other Possible Possessors
If there is evidence that excludes all of the other possible
guilty parties, the inferences should be allowed. In Evans v.
United States,1 the defendant and one Mildred Moore were
the only adults who had access to the premises where a small
quantity of marijuana was found. Moore denied any knowledge of the marijuana. The defendant made a statement that
tended to confirm Moore's denial, but also denied that he had
any knowledge of the marijuana. The court held that the trier
of fact was entitled to accept Moore's disclaimer, leaving the
defendant as the only person who could have placed the marijuana where it was found. 2
In Spatara v. State,' the defendant was living with
another person, and both were charged with possession of
marijuana. They were tried separately, and at the defendant's
trial her roommate testified that the drawer in which part of

10.

11.
12.
13.

Florida-Frank v. State, 199 So. 2d 117 (Fla. Ct. App. 1967).
Georgia-Ivey v. State, 226 Ga. 821, 177 S.E.2d 702 (1970).
Indiana-Ledeke v. State, 296 N.E.2d 412 (Ind. 1973).
Maryland-Davis v. State, 9 Md. App. 48, 262 A.2d 578 (1970).
Michigan-People v. Davenport, 39 Mich. App. 252, 197 N.W.2d 521 (1970).
Missouri-State v. McGee, 473 S.W.2d 686 (Mo. 1971).
Nebraska-State v. Faircloth, supra note 4.
Oklahoma-Brown v. State, 481 P.2d 475 (Okl. Crim. App. 1972).
Texas-Brock v. State, 285 S.W.2d 745 (Tex. Crim. App. 1956).
Fed. Ct. App.-Evans v. United States, 257 F.2d 121 (9th Cir. 1958).
For the view that the only corroborative circumstance that should be sufficient is substantial evidence of the accused's past possession on his person,
see Whitebread & Stevens, Constructive Possession in Narcotics Cases: To
Have and Have Not, 58 VA. L. Rav. 751, 766 (1972).
Supra note 9, at 127.
Id. at 128.
Supra note 8.
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the contraband was found was used by the defendant. The
roommate also denied any knowledge of the marijuana, and
testified about a telephone call that evidenced the defendant's
knowledge of the presence of the marijuana. The court said
that the jury could accept the testimony of one accused over
that of another, and upheld the defendant's conviction.14 Because this testimony came from one who had an obvious interest in having it believed, the evidence does not provide as
strong a case as did the evidence in the Evans case. But it is
the job of the trier of fact to choose between conflicting evidence, and their acceptance of the roommate's testimony left
the defendant as the only possible guilty party.
Evidence of Actual Possession
Any evidence that the defendant has at some time had
actual possession of the contraband adds enough to non-exclusive possession to allow the inferences of possession and knowledge. Thus, when there is testimony that the defendant withdrew a bag containing marijuana from a building, exchanged
a small package from the bag for money, and then returned
the bag to the building," or when there was a witness who saw
the defendant throw the contraband away,1" the inferences
should be allowed.
Substantial Control
The state's argument in Mulligan, which was rejected
by the supreme court, was that since both appellants were
in possession of the premises, albeit non-exclusive possession, both had control of the premises, and therefore it should
be inferred that both had knowledge and possession of the
contraband found there. The problem with this argument is
that the appellants really had only the right to control the
premises, and there was no evidence that they exercised that
right. When there is evidence that a particular defendant
exercised substantial control over the particular area or place
14. Id. at 876.
15. Mills v. State, 483 S.W.2d 264 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
16. People v. Davenport, supra note 9. Note that the evidence must be that
the witness actually saw the defendant throw the contraband; testimony
that the defendant made a motion like he was throwing something away
is not enough. Carroll v. State, 90 Ariz. 411, 368 P.2d 649 (1962); State
v. Harris, 485 S.W.2d 612 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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where the contraband was found, that should be enough to
allow the inferences as to that defendant. One court that has
evidently accepted the substantial control test is the Arizona
Supreme Court in State v. Villavicenio.17 In the Villavicenio
case the defendant was charged with possessing heroin found
in a box on his back porch. The court held that even though
the porch was between two rows of apartments, and was accessible to anyone using the area, the defendant had dominion
and control over the box and its contents, and hence that there
was substantial evidence to support the jury's findings that
the defendant had knowing possession of the narcotic. 8
A good example of substantial control is the circumstance
of finding the contraband with or in the personal effects of
the defendant. In King v. State," marijuana was found in a
suitcase which also contained letters addressed to the defendant. In People v. Kanos,2 ° the contraband was found in a
man's coat, and the defendant was the only male living at the
premises. In Petty v. People,2 marijuana was found in a
box that also contained the defendant's Navy discharge papers.
In State v. Parra,22 the police found marijuana debris in a
suitcase that also contained letters addressed to the defendant.
In each of these cases, the court held that there was sufficient
evidence to raise the inferences of knowledge and possession.
It seems clear that such evidence links the defendant with the
contraband he is charged with possessing, and is therefore
sufficient to raise the inferences.
The substantial control test could be a useful tool in situations where there is a strong circumstantial indication that
the defendant was in possession of the contraband. In Feltes
v. People3 the Colorado Supreme Court upheld the convictions of defendants who were sleeping in bedrooms where substantial amounts of marijuana were found, but overturned
the convictions of those who were sleeping in bedrooms where
there was only marijuana debris or no contraband at all. The
17.
18.
19.
20.
21.
22.
23.

108 Ariz. 518, 502 P.2d 1337 (1972).
Id. at 1339, 502 P.2d.
335 S.W.2d 378 (Tex. Crim. App. 1960).
14 Cal. App. 3d 642, 92 Cal. Rptr. 614 (1971).
167 Colo. 240, 447 P.2d 217 (1968).
104 Ariz. App. 524, 456 P.2d 382 (1969).
Supra note 7.
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reason the court gave for upholding the convictions was the
proximity of the defendants to the marijuana." Proximity
by itself does nothing to connect the defendant with the contraband. In the Feltes case, however, there were circumstances
present other than proximity. The marijuana was in plain
sight on an adjacent bedstand in the bedroom where the defendants were sleeping.2" Altogether these circumstances tend
to show that the defendants had substantial control over the
particular place where the marijuana was found, which would
be a better basis than proximity for upholding their convictions.
Admissions
Many times statements made by the accused are sufficient
to raise the inferences. This is true when the accused admits
to smoking some of the marijuana earlier in the evening,2" or
that he threw heroin out a window,27 or when he says that he
is only a visitor, but that he had used the heroin discovered on
the premises," or when he is overheard asking a co-defendant
if the police found the contraband hidden in the bathroom,
commenting that he did not know how they found it.29
However, a statement by the defendant to the effect that
he has used drugs, or that he presently uses drugs, should not
by itself be sufficient to allow the inferences. Such an admission is inadequate because it does nothing to connect the
defendant with the particular contraband found. The admission might help strengthen a case, and would be relevant
when joined with other circumstances that tend to link the
defendant with the contraband,"0 but if the admission is all
that is added to non-exclusive possession, all rational conclusions other than the defendant's guilt have not been excluded.
Some courts have thought the defendant's failure to deny
a charge that he was in possession of an illicit drug was im24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.

Id. at 1132.
Id.
De La Garza v. State, 379 S.W.2d 904, 905 (Tex. Crim. App. 1964).
Gomez v. State, 365 S.W.2d 165, 166 (Tex. Crim. App. 1963).
Broadway v. State, 3 Md. App. 164, 237 A.2d 820 (1968).
People v. Rodriguez, 175 Cal. App. 2d 56, 345 P.2d 330, 332 (1959).
People v. Redrick, 55 Cal. 2d 282, 10 Cal. Rptr. 823, 359 P.2d 255, 257 (1961).
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portant as an admission by conduct. 1 The Wyoming Supreme
Court has recently held in a criminal case, however, that silence
in the face of an accusation or question cannot be admitted
into evidence because the defendant has a constitutional
right to remain silent.3" Therefore, such evidence could not
supply the missing link for non-exclusive possession cases in
Wyoming.
Another kind of admission by conduct-evidence that the
defendant showed a consciousness of guilt-presents a close
question. Such conduct, when displayed at a time when the
defendant is confronted with the possibility of contraband
being discovered, should be sufficient to raise the inferences.
For instance, in State v. Hull" a police officer knocked on
the door and identified himself. Immediately there was rapid
activity in the apartment, including the flushing of a toilet
and the running of water into a sink. Marijuana was found
trapped in the sink drain. In Guthrey v. State," when an
officer entered the room, the defendant ran into the bathroom
and tried to flush a syringe and needle down the toilet. In
King v. State 5 the defendant tried to flee when she arrived
home and found officers there. In People v. Redrick3 6 the
defendant allowed the officer to search his room, but lied
about having a key to a storeroom where contraband was
found. In each of the above cases the court found that the
conduct evidenced a consciousness of guilt which linked the
defendant with the contraband. That evidence, when added
to non-exclusive possession, was sufficient to allow the inferences to arise.
As McCormick"7 points out, however, there are many possible innocent reasons for such conduct other than the defendant's guilt of the crime charged, and such evidence can be
given too much weight. In People v. Hutchinson3 s the defen31. People v. Rodriguez, supra note 29, at 332, 345 P.2d.
32. Gabrielsen v. State, 510 P.2d 534, 538 (Wyo. 1973). The court said: "No
constitutional right of an accused person is more sacred than his right not
to make a statement or testify against himself, and it was highly' improper
for any comment or question to be made or asked thereto." See also Mr.
Justice Guthrie's concurring opinion in the same case beginning on page 539.
33. 15 Ariz. App. 134, 486 P.2d 814 (1971).
34. 507 P.2d 556 (Okl. Crim. App. 1973).
35. Supra note 19.
36. Supra note 30.
37. MCCORMICK, EVIDENCE § 271 at 655 (2nd Ed. 1972).

38. 71 Cal. 2d 342, 78 Cal. Rptr. 196, 455 P.2d 132 (1969).
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dant's mother found some marijuana in a room the defendant
shared with three brothers. There was no evidence which indicated to whom the marijuana belonged. The mother accused
the defendant of possessing it, and in the argument that ensued threatened to call the police. The defendant said, "God
dad, do something with mother. I can't stand this,''" and
then went to his bedroom. He subsequently left the house
through the bedroom window. The defendant testified that he
had no knowledge of the marijuana, that he had not heard
his mother call the police, and that he left the house to avoid
further conflict with his mother. The Supreme Court of California held that the jury could reasonably infer that the defendant's "flight" reflected consciousness of guilt, and
upheld his conviction." The defendant's explanation of why
he left the house was certainly plausible, and the evidence
left at least one rational conclusion other than the defendant's
guilt. If the evidence had shown that the defendant had heard
his mother call the police and had then left the house, it might
have evidenced consciousness of guilt. However, since there
was no evidence that the defendant was even aware that his
mother had carried out her threat to call the police, there is
no evidence to connect the defendant with the contraband,
and the inferences should not have been allowed.
Debris
In People v. Underhill' the defendants were in a car
in which marijuana was found. The court held that the fact
that the two passengers had marijuana debris on their clothes
and other personal effects, plus the fact that they acted nervous when they were arrested, was sufficient to indicate knowledge and possession of the contraband. In State v. Parra"
the fact that debris was found with the personal effects of
the defendant was held to provide a sufficient link. In Feltes
v. People,4 3 however, the Supreme Court of Colorado did not
think the fact that debris was found in the bedroom where
two of the defendants were sleeping, or the fact that debris
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.

Id. at 133, 455 P.2d.
Id. at 134, 455 P.2d.
169 Cal. App. 2d 862, 338 P.2d 38, 41 (1959).
Supra note 22.
Supra note 7.
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was found under the cushions of the couch where one of the
defendants was sleeping, was a sufficient link to allow the inferences to be raised.
Evidence of Being Under the Influence of, or Having Recently
Used the Contraband
A showing that the defendant was under the influence of
the contraband when arrested, or that very shortly before his
arrest he had used the contraband, should sufficiently link
the defendant with the contraband." There is, however, a
California case, People v. Boddie,4 5 where the defendant was
a passenger in a car in which heroin was found in the glove
box. The defendant's arm had fresh needle marks that indicated that he had recently administered some drug to himself.
When he was arrested the defendant was swaying, and there
was expert testimony to the effect that he was under the influence of narcotics at the time of arrest. The court held that
these facts were not sufficient to allow the inference that the
defendant knew of the heroin in the glove box, and overturned the conviction. While certainly it is within the realm
of possibility that the defendant had no knowledge of the
heroin, it seems that there was substantial evidence for the
trier of fact to conclude that he did.
If the inferences are to be allowed, however, the evidence
should show that the defendant had used drugs very shortly
before he was arrested. If the evidence shows only that at
some other time the defendant has used drugs, the inferences
should not be allowed. Such evidence, like an admission of
previous use, does nothing to link the defendant with the particular contraband he is accused of possessing. In Collini v.
State" the evidence showed that the defendant had nonexclusive possession, and that he had a reputation as a druguser. There was no evidence to show when the defendant had
last used drugs, and therefore no evidence that linked the
defendant with the drug that was found. The court held that
the evidence was insufficient to sustain the conviction.
44. See, e.g., Ward v. State, 404 P.2d 59 (OkI. Crim. App. 1965); Davenport
v. State, 482 S.W.2d 165 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
45. 274 Cal. App. 2d 408, 80 Cal. Rptr. 83 (1969).
46. 487 S.W.2d 132 (Tex. Crim. App. 1972).
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In Davis v. State" a Maryland court gave too much
weight to evidence that the defendant had previously used
drugs. The evidence that most strongly supported the conviction showed that the defendant lived in an apartment only
about two days a week; that there was a box containing narcotic paraphernalia and marijuana in plain view in the living
room; that the defendant walked in while the police were
searching the premises; and that the defendant had needle
marks on his arms. The court sustained his conviction because the contraband was in plain sight, and because the defendant had needle marks on his arms. The fact that the contraband was in plain sight does not connect it with the defendant, since he lived there only a small percentage of the time.
When the fact is added that the defendant had previously
used drugs (evidenced by the needle marks on his arms) there
is still nothing to connect the defendant with the particular
contraband he was charged with illegally possessing. The
evidence allowed the conclusion to be drawn that the contraband was in the possession of the defendant's roommate, who
lived in the apartment all the time, and therefore the inferences should not have been allowed.
Proximity
Evidence that the defendant was in physical proximity
with the contraband does not, by itself, provide a sufficient
link between the defendant and the contraband. In State v.
McGee"9 the police entered an apartment where the defendant
lived with two others. There were from six to eight people
sitting around a table where marijuana was found, including
the defendant. The Missouri Supreme Court held that those
facts alone were not sufficient to sustain a conviction for illegal possession of an illicit drug. In Frazierv. State" police
received a report that there was marijuana in the backyard
of the duplex where the defendant lived. Two police officers
arrived, and watched the defendant approach the box and
apparently take something out of it. The police officers arrested the defendant, who put his hands behind him when he
47. Supra note 9.
48. Supra note 9.
49. Supra note 4.
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was stopped. No contraband was found on the defendant's
person, but later particles of marijuana were found close to
the spot where the defendant had been stopped. The court
held that there was no proof that the defendant had placed
the box in the yard or the particles on the ground. The defendant's proximity to the contraband and his non-exclusive
possession of the area where it was found were not sufficient
to sustain his conviction."
In State v. Faircloth1 proximity by itself was considered
a sufficient corroborating circumstance to allow the inferences. In Faircloththe defendant and two others were taking
a long automobile trip. They were stopped by the police, who
found contraband in a duffel bag on the floor beneath the
defendant. There was no evidence to indicate who owned the
duffel bag. The court held that the defendant's proximity
to the duffel bag was substantial evidence of his knowledge
of the contraband, and upheld the conviction. Such a result
turns chance seating arrangements on a long automobile trip
into a dangerous game of musical chairs-where the loser
goes to jail.
It should be noted, however, that evidence of the defendant's proximity is not entirely irrelevant. As was pointed
out earlier," proximity can be an important factor in determining whether the defendant has what has been called substantial control.
Possible Exceptions
Two jurisdictions that have adopted the non-exclusive
possession rule have developed exceptions to it. In Lander
v. State the Georgia Supreme Court held that if a husband
and wife live together, the husband is the head of the house
and therefore any contraband found on the premises are presumed to be his, even if there are no other corroborating circumstances. This was true even though the title to the real
estate was in the wife's name. In State v. Funk" the Missouri
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

Id. at 616.
Supra note 4.
See Substantial Control section of this case note, supra.
114 Ga. 687, 152 S.E.2d 431, 432 (1966).
490 S.W.2d 354, 363 (Mo. Ct. App. 1973).
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Court of Appeals criticizes this exception on the grounds
that women are now emancipated, and therefore a husband
should not be held responsible for his wife's misdeeds. The
court held that even if they were to accept the exception it
would not apply in the Funk case because in that case there
was a teenage stepson living in the house. The court reasoned
that in today's permissive society a father should not be
held responsible for what his son might have done.
In Ledcke v. State" the Supreme Court of Indiana held
that the mere fact that the defendant was present at a place
where marijuana was being processed presented a prima
facie case that he had knowledge and possession of the marijuana. The court said that if other circumstances and evidence do not provide an explanation for the defendant's
presence, that alone is sufficient to sustain a conviction.
Conclusion
0
The Wyoming Supreme Court has, in Mulligan v. State,"
adopted the rule that when a person does not have exclusive
possession of premises where a controlled substance is found,
some other corroborating circumstance must be found before
that person can be convicted of illegal possession of illicit
drugs. Non-exclusive possession does not sufficiently connect the defendant with the contraband to allow the triers of
fact to make the necessary inferences that the defendant had
knowledge and possession of it. To allow the inferences to
arise, the corroborating circumstance should be of a kind that
will provide the necessary connection between the defendant
and the contraband. The kinds of circumstances which provide such a connection are: (1) evidence that excludes all
other possible possessors; (2) evidence of actual possession;
(3) evidence that the defendant had substantial control over
the particular place where the contraband was found; (4)
admissions of the defendant that provide the necessary connection, which includes both verbal admissions and conduct that
evidences a consciousness of guilt when the defendant is confronted with the possibility that an illicit drug will be found;
55. Suprau note 9, at 417.
56. Supra note 4.
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(5) evidence that debris of the contraband was found on the
defendant's person or with his personal effects; (6) evidence
which shows that the defendant, at the time of the arrest, had
either used the contraband very shortly before, or was under
its influence.
The kinds of evidence which might be relevant, but which
by themselves do not add the necessary connection are: (1)
admissions of previous use; (2) conduct that might be construed as evidencing a consciousness of guilt which was not
displayed upon the defendant's confrontation of the possibility that an illicit drug would be discovered; (3) evidence
of previous use; (4) evidence that showed the defendant's
physical proximity to the contraband.
While many fine distinctions are made as to whether the
different kinds of corroborating circumstances should be
sufficient to allow the inferences to arise, these distinctions
are necessary. To convict a person of illegal possession of an
illicit drug there must be circumstances from which the inferences of knowledge and possession can reasonably be
drawn. Limiting the circumstances to those that provide a
link between the defendant and the contraband minimizes
the danger that someone will be convicted for possessing his
roommate's illicit drug.
LAWRENCE B. COZZENS
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